Arkibong Bayan archived webpages:

The Hacienda Luisita Massacre


Posted: November 10, 2009






Five years ago, on November 16, 2004, 8 striking workers died, 200 others were injured and 120 farm workers and activists were arrested after the violent dispersal of striking farmworkers in Hacienda Luisita. The dispersal was due to an order by then Labor Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas on Nov.16 on behalf of the Cojuangco family through the much abused pro-landlord and pro-capitalist tool known as Assumption of Jurisdiction (AJ).

Today, five years later, Hacienda Luisita, Inc (HLI) remains in the hands of one of the biggest landlords in the country-- the Cojuangcos. Even if DAR and PARC has resolved that the SDO (Stock Distribution Option) be revoked and the lands be distributed to farmers, the Conjuangco family, though a Supreme Court ruling, was able to get a TRO on SDO. With regards the criminal liabilities, the Ombudsman has absolved all civilian officials involved in the HLI massacre, and all cases against military and police agents are still pending in court.

As such, the farmers in HLI and the national federation of peasants in the Philippines, the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, along with other support oranizations, vowed to continue the fight in all arenas of struggle for 'land to the tillers' or genuine agrarian reform and social justice.


Read: The Continuing Saga of the Farmworkers of Hacienda Luisita



Jhayvie Basilio, 20 Juancho Sanchez, 20 Jhune David, 27 Jesus Laza, 34
Jaime Fastidio, 46 Adriano Caballero, 23 Jesse Valdez, 30

Ka Marcing Beltran, 53

Murdered on Dec. 8, 2004





Dead: 7

Wounded/injured: 200

Arrested: 120




 ◄ This blog was set up to serve as:


1) an archive of resources related to the ongoing struggle for land and justice in Hacienda Luisita

2) as running account of activities related to the upcoming caravan to Hacienda Luisita on Nov. 16 to commemorate the brutal massacre of striking agricultural workers five years ago (thus Luisita 5).


 News articles, essays, poetry, photos and other materials on the struggle in Hacienda Luisita will be linked and embedded in entries detailing the developments in the Cojuangco-owned tract of land in Tarlac.







 Unprovoked Carnage at Hacienda Luisita:


Video Clips and Stills from TV2-Magandang Gabi Bayan  feature on the carnage at Hacienda Luisita,

November 21, 2004









 Memorial service and funeral for the  Hacienda Luisita Massacre, Nov. 21, 2004





 Mga tula para sa mga biktima ng masaker sa Hacienda Luisita, Nov. 24, 2004





 Memorial service and solidarity gathering for the victims of the Hacienda Luisita Massacre, Part I, UP Balay Kalinaw, Nov. 22, 2004





 Memorial service and solidarity gathering for the victims of the Hacienda Luisita Massacre, Part I, UP Balay Kalinaw, Nov. 22, 2004


 AKLASAN - the final cut, Video clips and stills from Sine Patriotiko's Aklasan!


 Paskuhan sa Hacienda Luisita, Dec. 15, 2004



 Hatol ng Bayan sa kaso ng Hacienda Luisita Massacare, protest rally of workers in Mendiola, Jan. 14, 2005




 AKLASAN - a video by Sene Patriotiko



 ◄ This blog was set up to serve as


1) an archive of resources related to the ongoing struggle for land and justice in Hacienda Luisita

2) as running account of activities related to the upcoming caravan to Hacienda Luisita on Nov. 16 to commemorate the brutal massacre of striking agricultural workers five years ago (thus Luisita 5).


 News articles, essays, poetry, photos and other materials on the struggle in Hacienda Luisita will be linked and embedded in entries detailing the developments in the Cojuangco-owned tract of land in Tarlac.






On the 5th anniversary of the massacre of 7:

Land and justice for Hacienda Luisita farmers


Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac


November 16, 2009





November 16, 2009 Protest Caravan to Hacienda Luisita ( PHOTOS )

Critique of the PNP Report on the Hacienda Luisita Massacre

Summary of relevant information and analysis of what happened on the days leading up to and the day itself of the Hacienda Lusita massacre on November 16, 2004


Massacre Shooters Go Berserk in Tarlac; Claim 8th Victim

Hero of the Hacienda People

Tirso Cruz: 14th Luisita Martyr


Profiles ng pitong welgistang pinaslang sa Hacienda Luisita
noong 16 Nobyembre 2004

Sen. Aquino must give a substantial response to the Luisita conflict (UPDATED)






by Atty. Jobert Ilarde-Pahilga, executive director Sentro Para sa Tunay na Repormang Agraryo (Sentra), and campaign officer of National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers (NUPL)


In 1957, Jose Cojuanco Sr., bought majority shares of the Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT), including the 6,453-hectare Hacienda Luisita from the Spanish company Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) thrug a loan from the Central Bank. The CAT and hacienda are transferred to Cojuangco’s Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), an agricultural corporation.


On May 7, 1980, the Marcos government filed a case against TADECO before the RTC of Manila for specific performance to compel defendants TADECO, and the heirs of the late Jose Cojuangco, Sr. to turn over “Hacienda Luisita” to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for the purpose of subdivision and sale at cost to “small farmers” or “tenants”.

On December 2, 1985, the Manila RTC rendered a decision that orders the Cojuangcos to transfer control of Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which will distribute the land to small farmers after compensating the landowners P3.988 million.

The Cojuangcos elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA G.R. 08634. March 17, 1988, the Solicitor General, CB governor and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) filed a motion to dismiss the civil case against the Cojuangcos pending before the Court of Appeals on the ground that Hacienda Luisita would be covered by agrarian reform. Thus, on May 18, 1988, the Court dismissed the case against the Cojuangcos.


On May 9, 1989, the landowners, along with then DAR Secretary Philip Juico, Tarlac governor and the mayors of Tarlac City, Concepcion, and La Paz, the three municipalities covering the hacienda, held referendum among Luisita farm workers to present the SDO. Thereafter, Juico, Tadeco and HLI signed Memorandum of Agreement on the SDO.

In the MOA of May 11, 1989, HLI was designated as the SECOND PARTY to which the TADECO has transferred and conveyed the agricultural portions of Hacienda Luisita and other farm-related properties in exchange for shares of stock of the farm workers. The agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita which was covered by the MOA consisted of 4,915.75 hectares with an appraised value of P196, 630 million or approximately P40, 000 per hectare.

Based on the MOA the farmworkers supposedly owned 33.296% of the outstanding capital stock of the HLI, which was P355, 531,462 or 355,531,462 shares at 1 peso per share before May 10, 1989. In the stock distribution plan 33.296% of capital stock or P118, 391,976.85 or 118,391,976.85 shares will be distributed to farmworker beneficiaries within 30 years. Thus, the P118 million worth of shares of stocks would be distributed to the farm workers not as a “one-shot deal” but for a period of thirty years at 1/30 per year

As likewise provided on the MOA, the qualified beneficiaries of the stock distribution plan shall be the farmworkers who appear in the annual payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees, who are regularly or periodically employed by the TADECO

Thus, the distribution of the farmworkers’ shares of stock is actually based on the number of hours of work or mandays in the hacienda. The mandays in turn, are based on the system of guaranteed mandays, wherein the management of the HLI allocates the number of mandays available for manual work. Moreover, if a farmworker will be dismissed from employment for any cause and therefore his name will not appear in the annual payroll, he will not receive any shares of stock for the year he was dismissed onwards. On the otherhand, a newly employed worker, although he is not a resident of the hacienda and should therefore not be beneficiary of the SDO, as his name appeared on the annual payroll, will receive such shares of stock on the basis of his mandays.


In the year 2003, the daily wage for seasonal workers is P199.17 and for casuals, P194.50 which translates to a maximum of P1, 327.80 and P1, 296, respectively, per month based on 80 guaranteed mandays. After deductions for the loans and advance pays, the average take home pay is P18 for the seasonal, or P9 for the casual for a 2-manday week.

Aside from the diminishing mandays and horrendous and intolerable take home pay, the area of the land originally placed under SDO likewise diminished by Land Use Conversion (LUC).

As guaranteed mandays dwindle, massive lay-off of farm workers in sugar-coated forms like early retirement (replete with quit claim/waiver documents) or the more direct retrenchment become widespread.


On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for conversion a 500 hectares land of the hacienda.

On September 1, 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan ng Tarlac reclassified 3,290 hectares of hacienda Luisita from agricultural to commercial, industrial and residential purposes.

On August 14, 1996, DAR approved the conversion of 500 hectares of the 3,290 hectares of reclassified Luisita land and has already been converted into the Luisita Industrial Park.



The 500 hectares were sold for over two billion pesos (P2,000,000,000.00) yet, the farmworkers were only given P37.5 million by treating the same as 3% of gross sale from the production. In this year of 2006, sixty six (66) hectares is converted to make way for infrastructure projects like the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway.


On September 28, 2003 elections for farm workers’ and supervisors’ representatives to the HLI Board of Directors only 15.26% of the shares voted thereof. Around 95% of the farm workers boycotted the elections as a protest to the SDO and because the four board seats were useless against seven management seats.

On October 14, 2003, the Supervisory Group of Hacienda Luisita, Inc. filed petition before the DAR to revoke SDO, saying the HLI was not giving them dividends, their one percent (1%) share in gross sales and thirty percent (33%) share in the proceeds from the conversion of 500 hectares of land. They likewise cited other violations by the HLI of the MOA and that their lives have not improved contrary to the promise and the rationale for the adoption of the SDO.

On October 7, 2003, during the opening of the milling season, more than a thousand farmworkers gathered to protest the SDO, land-use conversion, joblessness at the hacienda.

On December 4, 2003, around 80% of the 5,339 farmworkers at the hacienda through their organization, AMBALA, filed a petition to DAR to nullify and rescind the SDO and to stop land-use conversion at the hacienda.


On November 6, 2004, members of the Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union (CATLU) and members of the United Luisita Workers' Union (ULWU) simultaneously staged a strike and blocked the mill's Gate 1 and Gate 2. The strike arose from the deadlock in the negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between CATLU and HLI (HLI) and the illegal dismissal of 327 farm workers belonging to ULWU on October 1, 2004.

On November 16, 2004 a violent dispersal of striking workers leave seven (7) dead, scores were injured. This has been known as the infamous Hacienda Luisita Massacre.

On November 22, 2004, the DAR issued Special Order No. 789 which called for the strengthening of the Task Force Stock Distribution Option through the PARC Secretariat.

On Nov. 25, 2004, the DAR task force stock distribution, later renamed Task Force Luisita, convened for the first time to discuss the petitions by Luisita supervisors and farmworkers. Prior thereto, HLI filed with the DAR its answer to the petition/protest filed by the supervisory group of respondent Zuniga and Andaya.

On March 15, 2005, DAR deployed 10 teams to 10 barangays within the hacienda to conduct focus group discussions with 453 farmers concerning their understanding of SDO, the supposed benefits thereof, the home lots and other provisions of the agreement, their recommendations on the SDO, and to determine whether there is truth to the allegations of the farmworkers that they have been pushed deeper into the quagmire of poverty by the SDO and MOA.


In July 2005, Task Force Luisita submitted its report on findings and recommendations to DAR Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman especially as regards the investigation conducted on March 15, 2005.

In August 2005, Pangandaman created a special legal team to review the legal issues in the task force’s report.

On September 23, 2005, DAR special legal team submitted its terminal report on the two petitions, recommending the revocation of the 16-year-old SDO agreement in Hacienda Luisita.

On 23 December 2005, PARC issued Resolution No. 2005-32-01 which recalled/revoked the SDO plan of TADECO/HLI and placed the lands subject SDO plan under the compulsory coverage scheme of the CARP.

On January 3, 2006, HLI filed its motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.


In February 2006, despite the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration it has filed, HLI filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the PARC et al., before the Supreme Court.

Meantime, on May 3, 2006 PARC denied the motion for reconsideration of HLI.

In June 2006, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) which enjoins PARC and DAR to implement/execute the resolution revoking the SDO.


In June of this year, HLI issued demand letters to the farmwokers to stop the cultivation of the hacienda. The farmworkers were give deadline until October 30, 2009. However, the farmworkers defied the demand and the deadline.

In October of this year, HLI again issued another letter to the farmworkers requiring the farmworkers to register with HLI. They were given until November 15, 2009. But, the farmworkers will again defy the order.


Report of the Health Team on the Hacienda Luisita Massacre

A paper submitted by Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD)
and Health Action for Human Rights (HAHR)
(12 January 2005, Philippine Senate)


On November 6, 2004, over 5,000 workers and agricultural laborers of Hacienda Luisita began a strike in order to highlight their demands for higher wages and better working benefits and conditions, as well as signify their disgust over the company’s union-busting and unfair labor practices. These were the main issues that have worsened their already miserable plight.

At the backdrop is the long-standing problem of land. Despite the coverage of the hacienda under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in 1987, the Cojuangcos, who were the landowners of the hacienda, opted for the Stock Distribution Option (SDO). SDO was one of the non-land transfer schemes that made the CARP beneficiaries supposedly “part-owners” of the land while virtually maintaining their status as workers or agricultural laborers. Hence, this historical failure to implement the fundamental principle of “land to the tiller”, which is the social justice aspect of land reform, set the tenor for the current struggle within the hacienda.

Immediately after the strike was set, two attempts were made by the local PNP to break the picket-line and disperse the strikers: the first on the evening of November 6 itself and the second on the morning of November 7. Both attempts failed as the number of strikers and their families and supporters swelled to thousands and bravely defended their positions.

The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas, then took over the issue through the “assumption of jurisdiction” and immediately issued a “return-to-work” order on November 10. After being largely ignored, Sec. Sto. Tomas then issued an order on November 15 “deputizing” the AFP Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM) to assist the Philippine National Police-Region 3 and local DOLE officials in enforcing the “return-to-work” order.

Hence, on November 16, even though the union leaders were still exhausting all avenues of negotiations with the Cojuangcos, a combined force of an estimated 700-strong provincial and regional PNP and 17 truckloads of fully-armed soldiers from the 69th Infantry Battalion Philippine Army (PA) and the 33rd Light Armor Company PA stationed at the NOLCOM entered the vicinity of Gate 1 near the picket-line. They were accompanied by two V150 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and two fire trucks.

The dispersal of the strikers outside Gate 1 began at around 3:00 p.m. when the AFP and PNP started shooting teargas canisters into the strikers’ positions. One of the APCs even tried to crash over the barricades set by the strikers in Gate 1. After failing to do so, shots were suddenly heard and the strikers started to scamper away. However, the shootings continued even after the strikers were already fleeing. Many saw other strikers fall even as they were already trying to run for cover or move out of harm’s way.

At the end of the violent and brutal dispersal, 7 people were dead and scores more were wounded, including women and children. Many were hospitalized for gunshot wounds (GSW) although there were also other injuries from the mauling that ensued.

The AFP and PNP were quick to deny any wrongdoing. They both claimed that they fired their weapons in order to defend themselves. Congressman Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III and Sec. Eduardo Ermita quickly blamed the “Leftists and militants” and alleged “agent-provocateurs” who had supposedly infiltrated the ranks of the workers. Cong. Noynoy only stopped short of outrightly blaming the strikers for the violence, as the PNP and AFP were allegedly “only trying to enforce the law.”

This investigation was conducted, therefore, to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the brutal dispersal in order to determine the victims, especially the extent of damage to life and limb, and to determine those who are accountable. This investigation also indirectly seeks to assist the victims in their quest not just for redress but also for justice.


The health team was headed by Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD) and Health Action for Human Rights (HAHR) and included health professionals (i.e. physicians, nurses), health workers, and health students.

The health team conducted its investigations in three separate occasions: November 17, November 29, and December 4-5, 2004. The methodology involved direct interviews and medical check-ups of those who were injured (including those who were already hospitalized), interviews with relatives and witnesses of the casualties, direct inspection of the cadaver, and interviews with local officials and medical personnel, including Dr. Saturnino S. Ferrer, the physician who conducted the autopsy on five of the seven casualties.

The team conducted its own documentation, which included signed affidavits, medical records, photo-documentation, taped interviews, and records of direct examinations conducted by health team members. The team also reviewed other pertinent documents available, including review of relevant affidavits/sworn statements and a review of available videos.

The findings are divided into three parts: findings on the casualties, findings on the injuries, and findings on the conduct of surrounding medical facilities and health agencies.

Findings on the casualties

There were seven identified casualties. These were Jhaivie R. Basilio, Adriano R. Caballero, Jr., Jhune N. David, Jaime B. Fastidio, Jesus V. Laza, Juancho C. Sanchez, and Jessie M. Valdez. A summary of the information and findings on each of the casualties is attached as Annex A.

The bodies were brought to different funeral parlors from the site of incidence. Valdez, however, was reportedly brought to Camp Aquino before being brought to the funeral parlor where the autopsy was made. There was a gap of at least 19 hours from the time of incidence to the time the autopsies were conducted by Dr. Ferrer. It was also within this time gap that the alleged paraffin tests were done on the casualties.

Based on the data gathered by the health team, the following were significant:

All of the seven died of gunshot wounds, contrary to the report of the Provincial Health Office that Sanchez died of “severe head injury” and Laza died of “basal skull fracture”.
Three (i.e. Basilio, David, and Laza) suffered from multiple gunshot wounds while the other four had single but fatal gunshot wounds.
Except for two gunshot wounds, both of which were sustained by Laza, none of the 10 gunshot wounds of the other casualties were frontal. All of the entry wounds were either from the back or from the sides.
Two had other concomitant and suspicious-looking injuries. Basilio had contusions and lacerations on his face and neck areas, while Sanchez had a peri-orbital laceration and hematoma of the left eye, contusion hematoma over the lumbar area, and some discoloration on the feet. These were consistent with eyewitness accounts that the two were still alive when taken by the PNP and AFP and were mauled before being shot.
Six of the casualties were workers of Hacienda Luisita and all were residents of the hacienda. All were in their productive ages and had no previous severe illness.

Dr. Ferrer also noted “wax-like material” on the bodies of Basilio, Caballero, and Sanchez. However, the so-called paraffin tests were conducted without any consent or without being witnessed by relatives of the deceased, and even now, the document containing the actual results of the paraffin tests are still to be obtained.

Findings on the injuries

There were at least 121 injured, 44 of whom were seen and interviewed by the health team. Of the total injured, 108 were male and 6 were female, while 7 had no data on their sex. 63 were adults (between 20-59 years old), 11 were children (below 19 years old), 4 were of the geriatric age group (above 60 years old), and 43 had no age data. All were either employed in or residents of Hacienda Luisita and many were the breadwinners of their respective families. A summary of pertinent data on the injured is attached as Annex B.

Of the total injured, 32 were cases of gunshot wounds (GSW), of which 18 were seen, interviewed, and examined by the health team. Some were serious enough to warrant hospitalization, especially those with multiple injuries or multiple GSW. Some are still confined to various hospitals undergoing surgery. At least 5 of the GSW cases seen by the team still had bullets lodged inside their bodies.

Based on the clinical histories taken, many of injured were already running from Gate 1 when they were hit by the bullets. The gunshot wounds were not sustained from a single volley of fire but from a sustained volume of fire lasting up to almost 2 minutes.

Other injuries included teargas-related respiratory irritation, fractures (of the bones), contusions, abrasions, and lacerations, and contusions from blunt trauma. Most of these injuries were from the use of around 100 teargas canisters and from the ensuing stampede due to the shooting. However, at least two (one with multiple fractures and one with a fractured right hand) were the result of being repeatedly bludgeoned by the PNP with their riot sticks after the shooting.


Findings on the conduct of hospitals and health institutions

Based on data obtained by the health team, St. Martin de Porres Hospital, which is the nearest hospital from the site of incidence, being less than 300 meters away from Gate 1, transferred its existing in-patients at least a day before the incident occurred. Moreover, even before the violent dispersal was implemented, the hospital was secured by elements of the Army, aside from the PNP contingent earlier sent there to secure the hospital entrance. Also, Army medical personnel were already stationed in the hospital even before the shooting occurred.

The health team also finds the report of the Provincial Health Office (Annex C) to be flawed. For instance, one of the casualties, Juancho Sanchez, supposedly died of “severe head injuries” whereas autopsy findings show that he died of a single gunshot wound penetrating the left side near the pelvic area that hit his vital organs.

Similarly, the PHO report states that Jesus Laza supposedly died of “basal skull fracture”. However, the Initial Medico-Legal Report of the PNP Crime Laboratory signed by Dr. Reynaldo R. Dave, Jr. shows no head and neck injury and instead notes two GSW to the chest, both of which were fatal. It merits serious consideration as to how much weight should be given to the PHO Report given these significant errors, and why these errors were made in the first place.

Conclusions and recommendations

The health team finds adequate substantial evidence to state that the strikers of Hacienda Luisita were shot not “as a defensive stance” or because the PNP and AFP “were provoked” but rather as a direct armed offensive assault on the picket line. This assertion is supported by: a) the number and types of injuries and deaths, b) the character of the injuries and physical findings, and c) the volume and length of gunfire sustained against the strikers.

Moreover, the GSWs suffered by those who were killed and injured dispel any and all allegations that the PNP and AFP elements who fired their guns were doing so because they were under some sort of threat. Not even the alleged paraffin tests, conducted under dubious circumstances by the very same agency under question, can justify the blatant use of firearms, automatic and high-powered at that, against unarmed civilians. These are gross violations of the basic human rights of the strikers.

There is also no doubt that there was an excessive use of force during the November 16 incident. What is disturbing, however, is the fact that this excessive use of force is deliberate and intentional. Again, the injuries sustained by those who died and those who survived attest to this. The types and severity of the injuries belie any randomness and instead, point to a dangerous kind of recklessness spurred by an overarching intent to cause or inflict harm. There were even severe injuries due to blunt trauma sustained immediately after the shooting. The brutality of the dispersal thus casts a pall of shame on the PNP and serves as a grim reminder of why the AFP is prohibited from the picket lines.

Lastly, the findings of the health team point strongly to an element of premeditation rather than spontaneity (as is being alleged by the AFP and PNP), as regards the shooting. The size of the kill zone, as well as the volume of fire, as traced from the clinical histories, the character of the injuries, and the positions of the victims and casualties, all validate the element of premeditation. The events surrounding the St. Martin de Porres Hospital further corroborate this.

The health team, therefore, recommends that the findings and conclusions drawn by this report be investigated further and validated by other independent sources. First of all, the victims should be given immediate and adequate redress, through indemnification, of the damages and injuries to life and limb caused upon them to suffer.

Second, there should be a swift and decisive accounting of the responsibility for the deaths and injuries, not only from the AFP and PNP units involved but also from the government agencies (viz., DOLE, DILG, DND, and DAR) and the local government units. Appropriate administrative and criminal charges should immediately be filed.

Finally, if there is a genuine desire from the current dispensation to address the root causes of the conflict in Hacienda Luisita, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo should look closer and heed the demands of the working masses, the workers and agricultural laborers, for land, jobs, wages, and rights. Rather than merely dismissing this problem as a “purely labor issue”, the GMA administration should implement genuine agrarian reform and institute the much needed social justice demanded by the victims.

Annex A


Name/Personal Information/Autopsy Findings

Jhavie Basilio 20/male; single, hacienda worker 2 GSW (1 on the chest and 1 on the left buttocks) + contusions and lacerations on the head and neck areas

Adriano Caballero, Jr./23/male; married, caddie in the hacienda/1 GSW on the left side of the chest

Jhune David 28/male; married,/ hacienda farm worker/2 GSW (1 on the zygomatic region and 1 on the trapezoid region)

Jaime Fastidio/46/male; married, hacienda laborer/1 GSW on the mandibular area through the neck

Jesus Laza 34/male; single, hacienda worker/2 GSW on the pectoral region

Juancho Sanchez/20/male; single, hacienda resident 1 GSW on the left pelvic area + peri-orbital laceration and hematoma of the left eye, contusion hematoma over the lumbar area, and some discoloration on the feet

Jessie Valdez 30/male; married, hacienda laborer/1 GSW on the right thigh

Annex B


Total injured: 121
Total seen by the health team: 44
All were either employed in or residents of Hacienda Luisita
Many were the breadwinners of their respective families

Breakdown by sex: Male – 108
Female – 6
No data – 7

Breakdown by age: Children (< 19 years) – 11
Adults (>19 and <60 years) – 63
Geriatric (>60 years) – 4
No data – 43

No. of Gunshot Wounds (GSW): 32
GSW seen by the health team: 18
Some were serious enough to warrant hospitalization, especially those with multiple injuries or multiple GSW
Some are still confined to various hospitals undergoing surgery
At least 5 of the GSW cases seen by the team still had bullets lodged inside their bodies.

Other concomitant injuries:
1. teargas-related respiratory irritation
2. fractures (of the bones)
3. contusions
4. abrasions
5. lacerations
6. contusions from blunt trauma